State Organisation Act of Einsenland (British English)
Reference translation into British English. The Chinese source is available here. This translation preserves its numbering and legal status; it is not a jointly authenticated text of equal legal authority. See source and translation notes.
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State Organisation Act of the Republic of Einsenland
Section 1
This Act is enacted under the Constitution of the Republic of Einsenland to regulate the establishment, merger and abolition of State organs, the allocation of their powers and the appointment and removal of their leadership, and to implement constitutional separation of powers, checks and balances, responsible government and the rule of law.
Section 2
This Act regulates the organisation, powers and responsibilities of central State organs and is subject to the Constitution. Its description as a fundamental law does not automatically exclude laws of equal rank. Special organisational procedures require constitutional authority; conflicts of laws are resolved under the Constitution, the hierarchy of laws and statutory interpretation procedures.
Detailed matters of local self-government and the civil service are governed by the relevant laws. This Act's express transitional provisions and organisational safeguards apply directly before implementing legislation is enacted.
Section 3
This Act applies to all central State organs established by the Constitution or law, including the legislature, Head of State, executive, judiciary, independent bodies, military bodies and their supporting institutions.
Its provisions on statutory powers, liability, disclosure and supervision apply, with the necessary adaptations and within the authorised scope, to organisations authorised by law to exercise public power.
Section 4
The establishment, organisation and operation of State organs must observe:
(1) constitutional supremacy: every organ is bound by the Constitution and must not exercise powers it does not confer;
(2) statutory powers: establishment, merger, abolition and powers require a legal basis; administrative orders, internal rules and subordinate instruments must not create, enlarge or transfer statutory powers;
(3) separation and checks: legislative, executive, judicial and independent supervisory powers must remain mutually independent and subject to checks; no organ may usurp, combine or exercise another's core powers;
(4) democratic accountability: the executive is politically accountable to Parliament; the election and removal of members, the President and other statutory elected office-holders are determined by the popular will;
(5) clear responsibility: powers and responsibilities must be stated in publicly identifiable schedules, permitting accountability and remedies;
(6) transparency: organisational structures, procedures, reasons for decisions, budgets and performance must be public, except lawfully confidential matters;
(7) efficiency and coordination: overlapping functions and gaps in competence must be avoided, and jurisdictional disputes promptly determined by statutory procedures; and
(8) sunset provisions: temporary and special-purpose bodies must have a defined lifespan and cease automatically on completion of their tasks; they must not become permanent without authority.
Section 5
Heads of State organs and public officials must be loyal to the Constitution and law, not to individuals, political parties, interest groups or other private powers.
No State organ may establish, permit or participate in secret allegiance organisations, parallel command systems or internal power structures unconstrained by law.
Section 6
Central State organs comprise the legislature and its supporting bodies, the President and Presidential Office, the Government and administrative authorities, courts and prosecution authorities, and lawfully independent integrity, audit, electoral and regulatory bodies.
The National Military Commission is a professional coordinating body within the Government's defence system, and the National Intelligence Agency forms part of the governmental administration. Neither constitutes a branch of State power independent of responsible government.
Section 7
Legal personality, budgetary safeguards and independence of powers are separately determined by law. Ordinary administrative departments and subordinate bodies are subject to the lawful leadership of the Prime Minister, Cabinet and responsible Minister; legal personality does not itself remove that leadership.
Courts, prosecution, audit, electoral and independent regulatory bodies are not subject to administrative instructions in their statutory functions. This does not exempt them from fiscal transparency, audit or judicial remedies. Concurrent offices and appointments require legal authority and compliance with recusal rules.
Section 8
State organs must prepare and publish schedules of powers and responsibilities as follows:
(1) the schedule of powers must identify each power's legal basis, holder, conditions, procedure, persons affected and remedies;
(2) the schedule of responsibilities must identify the corresponding legal and political responsibilities and means of supervision;
(3) the schedules must be signed by the head, filed with Parliament and published; and
(4) they must be updated at least once every three years and adjusted within six months after a new law or constitutional amendment takes effect.
Section 9
Exercise of powers requires a clear legal basis. Without statutory authority, an organ must not:
(1) add powers or enlarge jurisdiction;
(2) add requirements for licensing, registration, filing, charges or penalties;
(3) create obligations, restrict rights or alter liabilities; or
(4) establish internal, territorial or affiliated bodies not provided for by law.
Section 10
The law must identify the lead, assisting, executing, funding and remedial bodies for each matter. The Prime Minister must coordinate and determine disputes within the executive within seven days; coordination must not enlarge statutory powers.
Disputes between categories of State organ or concerning local self-government are determined by the Constitutional Court. The competent court reviews the lawfulness of ordinary administrative acts. Emergency action is limited to existing authority and necessity and must be reported promptly; acting first does not create permanent powers.
Section 11
Parliament is the State legislature, comprising the House of the People and House of Regions. Its powers are to:
(1) enact, amend and repeal laws and constitutional amendments;
(2) consider and approve the State budget, final accounts, tax bills and major fiscal matters;
(3) approve major public debt issues and major international treaties;
(4) supervise the Government, independent bodies and judicial administration;
(5) appoint, remove, consent to appointment or dismiss the senior State office-holders specified in this Act;
(6) approve declarations of war, peace settlements, military alliances, and the declaration and termination of states of emergency;
(7) examine impeachment proceedings;
(8) receive reports from the Commission for Public Welfare and Integrity, National Audit Office, Constitutional Court, Independent Electoral Commission and other bodies; and
(9) exercise other powers conferred by the Constitution and law.
Section 12
Separate votes of the Houses must be distinguished from joint discussion. Ordinary legislation, conciliation and fiscal procedures are governed by Article 23 of the Constitution; constitutional amendment by Article 56. Combined votes at a joint sitting do not replace separate consent.
Separate consent is required for fundamental guarantees of local self-government, administrative boundaries, central–local powers, allocation of local finances and major alterations to cross-provincial trunk infrastructure. The order of first consideration must not enlarge veto powers over other matters.
Section 13
Parliament holds one ordinary session annually; its duration is determined by standing orders.
An extraordinary session must be convened where:
(1) at least one quarter of all members of either House jointly request it;
(2) the President requests it;
(3) the Prime Minister requests it and the Speaker agrees; or
(4) declaration of a state of emergency or war requires it.
Section 14
The House of the People has three hundred members serving five-year terms: one hundred and fifty constituency seats and one hundred and fifty national-list seats. The parallel two-vote system prescribed by the Electoral Act produces no overhang or compensatory seats.
Section 15
The House of the People first considers general fiscal, taxation, budget, public welfare and government policy bills, determines confidence in the Government, elects a successor Prime Minister, lawfully supervises State organs and exercises specially prescribed appointment-consent powers.
Constructive no confidence is governed by Article 24 of the Constitution; presidential impeachment by Article 28. Accountability and removal of other senior officials must distinguish political responsibility, statutory discipline and judicial adjudication. Protected judges or heads of independent bodies must not be removed for policy disagreement.
Section 16
The House has one Speaker and two Deputy Speakers, nominated by parliamentary groups or at least ten members and elected by secret ballot. The first ballot requires more than half of all members. If nobody qualifies, the two leading candidates proceed to a second ballot and the candidate with more votes wins. A tie requires a further ballot the next day, with new nominations permitted.
Before a new House elects its Speaker, or where all presiding officers cannot act, the longest continuously serving member presides temporarily. Equal seniority is resolved by age and, if still equal, public drawing of lots. The temporary presiding member may convene meetings, organise votes and issue constitutionally necessary notices, but does not replace policy votes. Delay in electing a Speaker must not obstruct government formation, the budget or emergency supervision.
Removal of a Speaker requires signatures from one third of members, approval by more than half of all members and simultaneous election of a successor. The Speaker's term follows the House's term and must not exceed two consecutive terms. The Speaker of the House of Regions serves three years, for no more than two consecutive terms, without extension of membership.
Section 17
The House establishes specialist committees, including at least:
(1) Constitutional and Legal Affairs;
(2) Budget and Finance;
(3) Foreign and External Affairs;
(4) Defence and National Security;
(5) Intelligence Oversight;
(6) Justice;
(7) Public Welfare and Social Policy;
(8) Economy and Industry;
(9) Education, Science, Technology and Culture;
(10) Public Services and Integrity;
(11) Local and Cross-regional Affairs; and
(12) Procedure and Standing Orders.
Committee chairs are allocated by agreement among parliamentary groups in proportion to seats. Standing orders govern procedure, membership, investigation and questioning powers.
Section 18
The House of Regions has seventy-two seats, eight for each of the eight provinces and the directly administered capital district, elected by local elected assemblies in proportion to parliamentary groups. Members serve six years, with four seats per territory renewed every three years. Replacement and initial staggering follow the Electoral Act.
The House represents local interests. Its members do not leave office collectively when the central Government is reorganised.
Section 19
The House considers bills concerning local interests, cross-provincial infrastructure, national security and defence, exercising constitutional powers of separate consent, time-limited objection, supervision and appointment consent.
Ordinary bills must be decided within thirty days, and budgetary and general fiscal opinions submitted within fifteen days. Matters requiring special consent on local self-government or finances are not deemed approved on expiry.
The House does not independently determine whether the Cabinet remains in office. The Government must nevertheless respond to its questions, investigations and representations on local interests.
Section 20
The House has one Speaker and two Deputy Speakers, elected and removed in accordance with Section 16, with the necessary adaptations.
Its specialist committees are established and operated under Section 17, with the necessary adaptations. It must in particular establish a Local Relations and Regional Coordination Committee and a Local Fiscal Equalisation Committee.
Section 21
The Bureau is established under Article 41 of the Constitution as a joint supporting body of the two Houses. It independently provides technical opinions under professional rules and does not independently legislate, approve constitutional amendments or adjudicate constitutionality.
Section 22
The Bureau scrutinises numbering, references, legal coherence and official-language texts, maintains the statute collection and provides implementation assessments. Ordinary technical opinions must be completed within ten days. Complex matters may be extended once, by no more than ten days, with both Speakers' consent.
Serious constitutional concerns must be notified in writing to the proposer and bodies entitled to seek constitutional review. Opinions inform the competent body's decision. Delay creates no independent veto and does not suspend constitutional publication periods, except where a court lawfully orders interim protection.
Section 23
The Bureau has one Director, two Deputy Directors and professional scrutiny officers. Following open professional selection, the Director is jointly nominated by the Speakers and approved separately by more than half of all members of each House, for seven years without reappointment.
Scrutiny officers are appointed through professional civil-service procedures. Appointment, recusal and disciplinary safeguards must not become a veto over policy content.
Section 24
Parliament has a Secretariat handling records, documentation, external affairs, security, information systems and public relations on a unified basis.
The Secretary-General is nominated by a joint sitting and appointed with separate majority approval of both Houses, for five years.
Section 25
Parliament may establish internal supporting bodies, such as a Budget and Legislative Research Office, Parliamentary Library and Members' Standards Committee. Their establishment, merger and abolition are governed by standing orders.
Section 26
Election, scrutiny of qualifications, resignation, vacancy replacement and immunity of members are governed by the Electoral Act and standing orders. The Members' Standards Committee deals with conduct, declarations of interests, discipline and sanctions; major matters are referred to the full membership for decision.
Section 27
Under Articles 25 to 29 of the Constitution, the President exercises representation, strategic initiative, constitutional safeguarding, appointment and commander-in-chief powers, without directly directing everyday administration. Laws may detail constitutionally authorised procedures but must not establish an independent presidential executive command system.
Section 28
The President promulgates laws, facilitates government formation, lawfully appoints the Prime Minister, Ministers and specified senior officials, chairs the National Security and Strategy Council, and exercises commander-in-chief, emergency, reform pilot-area approval and single reconsideration powers through the prescribed procedures.
Their scope is governed by Article 27 of the Constitution. Presidential orders do not create general administrative jurisdiction. The professional organisation of the National Military Commission follows Sections 103 to 108.
Section 29
Presidential promulgation of treaties, emergency orders, reform pilot areas, major military decisions and administrative instruments requiring execution, formed on governmental proposals, requires the countersignature of the Prime Minister or responsible Minister. Major military use and national general mobilisation require the Prime Minister's or Defence Minister's countersignature.
No countersignature is required for the first nomination of a Prime Minister, appointment following the House's election, constitutionally specified dissolution notices, reconsideration requests, constitutional review applications or internal Presidential Office affairs. Nomination of Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers belongs to the Prime Minister and is not an independent presidential appointment power.
Section 30
The President must promulgate laws, decisions approving plans and constitutional amendments within fifteen days after the statutory procedure is completed. Within that period the President may once request reasoned reconsideration by the originally competent body. If that body maintains its decision by the original threshold, promulgation must follow within seven days.
Clear constitutional concerns may be referred within those periods to the Constitutional Court. The application alone does not suspend execution or promulgation unless the Court lawfully grants interim protection. If the President neither seeks reconsideration or review nor promulgates in time, the Speaker of the House of the People issues a legally equivalent notice.
The same periods apply to a single reconsideration concerning use of statutory long-term reserves, major national planning adjustments and key independent appointments. They create no indefinite or repeated veto.
Section 31
Under Articles 53 to 55 of the Constitution, the Government proposes and the President declares states of emergency and emergency orders. They must be submitted to both Houses within forty-eight hours and separately ratified within seven days; without ratification they lapse.
Each period lasts no more than thirty days and extension requires fresh separate approval. Parliament, courts and independent supervision must not be suspended, nor organisational powers permanently altered. Reasons, scope and termination conditions must be published. Courts may review and suspend unlawful measures in accordance with law.
Section 32
A presidential order must state its constitutional or statutory basis, decision, period of validity, necessary countersignature and remedies. It must not create, amend or repeal laws. Minutes of the Security Council or Military Commission must not replace formal decisions by the competent organ.
Section 33
The President appoints the Prime Minister according to the House's confidence decision; Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and specified executive heads on the Prime Minister's nomination; and judges, the Prosecutor-General and independent heads following judicial or independent recommendations and consent of both Houses.
Nomination of the Chief of the General Staff by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister follows Section 108; intelligence heads follow Sections 112 and 114. Professional appointment of ordinary judges is not subject to individual presidential political selection.
Once recommendation and consent are completed, the President must act within seven days. Statutory qualification disputes must be referred within the prescribed period to the Constitutional Court; party affiliation or disagreement alone is not a ground for refusal. In the absence of an objection, if appointment is delayed, the lawful head of the original proposing or consenting body announces assumption of office.
Section 34
The Council is chaired by the President, with the Prime Minister as Deputy Chair, and considers national security strategy, major risks and interdepartmental coordination. National development plans follow their own Act and are not all subject to Council approval.
The Council does not replace Cabinet responsibility for execution or judicial determination of offences and must not issue a second set of everyday orders to ordinary departments, the armed forces or police.
Section 35
Voting members are the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Interior and Finance. Other responsible Ministers vote on matters within their portfolios.
Intelligence, police and military heads provide professional reports. The central bank and independent regulators attend within their competence without thereby becoming subject to executive operational instructions. Speakers, parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors handling cases are not voting members of executive decision-making.
A majority of statutory voting members forms a quorum; opinions require a majority of those present. The Prime Minister or lawful acting representative must attend. Failure to form an opinion does not prevent Cabinet from performing existing statutory duties.
Section 36
The Council proposes long-term security strategies, military and intelligence coordination, crisis assessments and emergency matters requiring parliamentary referral. Executive implementation, budgets, war authorisation or restrictions of rights must respectively follow Cabinet, parliamentary and judicial procedures.
Either President or Prime Minister may request a meeting. Urgent matters must be convened within twenty-four hours, others within seven days. If the President cannot chair or fails to do so in time, the Prime Minister chairs and reports. Disagreements and reasons must be recorded. Refusal to meet must not obstruct existing statutory duties.
Administrative security designations do not replace criminal trial or judicial warrants; complaint and review routes must be provided by law.
Section 37
The Council has a Joint Secretariat administratively supported by the Prime Minister's Office, serving the lawful deliberative needs of President and Cabinet without independent enforcement or appropriation powers. The Prime Minister appoints its Secretary-General after consultation with the President.
Minutes, dissenting opinions, implementation bases and budgets must be submitted to the relevant parliamentary oversight committee. Classified material must be submitted through lawful confidential arrangements; secrecy is not a general exemption from scrutiny.
Section 38
The Presidential Office assists the President and comprises:
(1) one Secretary-General responsible for everyday affairs;
(2) two to four Deputy Secretaries-General;
(3) a General Office, Protocol Bureau, Legal Affairs Bureau, Security Bureau and Press Bureau;
(4) liaison positions in the Presidential Office for the Council's Joint Secretariat, without a parallel secretariat;
(5) an Office for National Honours and Ceremonies; and
(6) presidential advisers.
The President appoints the Secretary-General, with filing before the House of the People. Other staff are appointed and removed by the President under civil-service law.
Section 39
The Presidential Office must not exercise governmental administrative powers or issue administrative orders to ministries, commissions, bureaus or agencies.
Presidential communications to the administration through the Office must take the form of consultation or recommendations. Specific decisions implementing law are valid only through the procedures of the Prime Minister or responsible Minister.
Section 40
The Government comprises the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and members expressly included in Cabinet by law, such as the Chair of the National Development Commission. Cabinet collectively decides administrative policy, is politically accountable to the House of the People and is supervised by both Houses.
Section 41
The Government's powers are to:
(1) implement the Constitution, laws and parliamentary resolutions;
(2) make and issue administrative regulations and rules within statutory authority;
(3) prepare and submit annual budgets, final accounts and major fiscal plans;
(4) lead ministries, commissions, bureaus, agencies and their territorial bodies;
(5) implement foreign policy, handled by the Foreign Ministry under the President's external representation;
(6) lead the civil administration;
(7) maintain public order and ensure public services;
(8) coordinate executive bodies and deal initially with their disputes; and
(9) exercise other statutory powers.
Section 41A
Administrative posts are divided into political offices expressly listed by law and permanent professional posts. Ministers, specified political Deputy Ministers and political advisers bear political responsibility to the appointing authority. A post not expressly classified as political must not be converted into a political appointment by internal documents alone. Adviserships, temporary employment or project appointments must not circumvent staffing limits or conflicts rules.
Permanent civil servants, technical staff and professional project teams are recruited and promoted by public qualifications, competition and professional assessment. The Government must publish classifications, necessary qualifications and procedures. Classified posts may use supervised security vetting, but party loyalty must not replace professional qualifications.
Section 41B
Permanent staff must give successive lawfully formed governments impartial, timely and recorded professional advice and implement lawful decisions without refusing duties on partisan grounds. Public office, personnel data, budgets and public facilities must not be used for campaigning. This does not generally prohibit lawful political expression or association outside official duties; specially neutral posts expressly listed by law follow their particular rules.
Officials must declare relevant interests, recuse themselves lawfully and retain procurement, assessment and decision records. Suspected unlawful orders must be flagged in writing and reported through supervisory, prosecutorial or judicial procedures. Manifestly unlawful orders or orders to commit offences must be refused. Lawful reporting and refusal are protected against retaliation.
Section 41C
Assessment must rest on statutory duties, service quality, professional competence and integrity, not support for the governing party, conviction rates, fine revenue or construction speed disregarding safety. Policy disagreement, different professional advice and a change of government do not alone justify removal, demotion or discipline.
Serious dereliction, corruption and incompetence may lead to lawful investigation, training, reassignment or discipline. Before sanction, the facts and grounds must be notified and representations, recusal, independent review or judicial remedies allowed. Urgent suspension requires reasons showing necessity to protect evidence or public safety and periodic review; it does not prejudge guilt.
Section 41D
Within thirty days of the successor taking office, a public handover inventory must cover statutory duties, planned projects, contracts, budget balances, debts and guarantees, litigation, security risks and responsibility for records. Confidential matters must be submitted in protected form to competent oversight bodies; personal data are transferred only to the minimum necessary extent.
Permanent administrative heads must maintain essential services and complete records. They must not dismiss all professional staff without cause, destroy records or rush contracts beyond authority to bind successors. A new government may lawfully change policy and appoint political personnel; existing plans, contracts and staff remedies do not thereby lapse.
Section 42
The Prime Minister takes office under Article 31 of the Constitution, leads Government, chairs Cabinet, coordinates approved national plans, budgets and departmental execution, nominates and adjusts Ministers, leads the professional civil service and lawfully exercises emergency powers.
The Prime Minister is accountable for confidence to the House of the People and reports to both Houses and the public. Presidential strategic initiatives require a lawful response. Administration must not cease because President and Prime Minister belong to different parties.
Departure, caretaker government and constructive no confidence follow Articles 24 and 31. The President has no unilateral power of political dismissal of the Prime Minister.
Section 43
No more than five Deputy Prime Ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President. They assist under published allocations of work without independent command systems.
During temporary incapacity, the previously designated First Deputy acts; without designation Cabinet selects an acting head. Permanent vacancy or acting service exceeding sixty days triggers constitutional government formation. Caretaker government maintains necessary functions; expiry of an acting period does not stop services.
Section 44
The Prime Minister chairs Cabinet, comprising Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers, the National Development Commission Chair and other statutory members. Independent heads and military or intelligence professionals may attend relevant discussions, but do not join executive votes over their independent powers. Majority and dissenting views must be recorded; the Government bears responsibility.
Section 45
Cabinet discusses and decides:
(1) bills, budgets, final accounts and treaties submitted to Parliament;
(2) administrative regulations and major rules;
(3) major interdepartmental executive decisions;
(4) proposals for appointments and removals at ministerial level or above;
(5) executive command during states of emergency; and
(6) matters the Prime Minister considers necessary for Cabinet discussion.
Cabinet meets at least weekly. Minutes, voting results and important resolutions must be published promptly, except where national security, trade secrets or personal privacy is involved.
Subchapter 1 — General Rules
Section 46
Ministries are professional executive bodies established by law. Their creation, merger, abolition and principal powers are prescribed by law. Bills establishing or adjusting them follow Article 23 of the Constitution. Separate consent is required only where local powers or other specially protected matters are affected; the House of Regions has no general absolute veto over every organisational adjustment.
Internal offices may be adjusted under public organisational rules within statutory powers, staffing and budgets. Internal adjustments must not add penalties or licences or enlarge external powers.
Section 47
Each ministry has one Minister, one to three Deputy Ministers and lawfully approved internal and territorial bodies. Under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister nominates Ministers and the President appoints them within seven days, without individual confidence votes in both Houses.
The Minister proposes Deputy Ministers according to their political or permanent professional status, and the Prime Minister appoints them lawfully. Permanent posts follow professional civil-service procedures. Party office does not replace State appointment.
Qualification disputes, presidential delay and removal follow Article 32 and Section 33, without additional repeated political approvals.
Section 48
The Prime Minister may propose appointment or removal of a Minister. The President must act within seven days; on delay the Prime Minister issues a lawful notice. The House of the People may investigate, question or censure an individual Minister and require the Prime Minister's response within fifteen days. Cabinet's continued tenure is governed by constructive no confidence.
Suspected offences or serious constitutional or legal breaches are investigated and tried lawfully. Supervisory and audit findings may be referred with accountability recommendations, but those bodies do not adjudge ministerial guilt or automatic removal.
Subchapter 2 — Ministry of Defence
Section 49
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for defence policy, military administration and civilian management of the military system. Its principal functions are:
(1) drafting defence policy, budgets and white papers;
(2) administering military personnel, pay, welfare, logistics, equipment and infrastructure;
(3) defence industry, arms procurement, technological research and export controls;
(4) reserves, mobilisation and veterans' affairs;
(5) coordination with foreign defence departments;
(6) implementing lawful Cabinet defence decisions and the Military Commission's professional coordination; and
(7) other statutory functions.
The Defence Minister represents responsible government in leading defence administration and transmission of orders. Professional operational command belongs to the Chief of the General Staff and statutory operational bodies under Book VII.
Section 50
The Defence Minister must be a civilian or have been retired from military service for at least five years. Appointment and removal follow Sections 47 and 48, without an additional personnel veto for the President, House of Regions or Military Commission.
The Minister leads defence administration and transmission of military orders on behalf of responsible government and is subject to defence scrutiny by both Houses.
Subchapter 3 — Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Section 51
The Ministry is responsible for external relations. Its principal functions are:
(1) implementing foreign policy formed through presidential representation procedures and Cabinet decisions, without two conflicting sets of departmental orders;
(2) preparing and negotiating treaties, agreements and diplomatic instruments;
(3) protecting nationals abroad and State interests;
(4) managing embassies, consulates, representative offices and delegations to multilateral organisations;
(5) issuing diplomatic passports and consular documents;
(6) coordinating foreign assistance, cultural diplomacy and international public affairs; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 52
Appointment and removal of the Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Ambassadors are nominated by the President, approved by the House of the People's Foreign and External Affairs Committee and appointed by the President.
Subchapter 4 — Ministry of Finance
Section 53
The Ministry is responsible for public finance, taxation, customs and public debt. Its principal functions are:
(1) preparing the annual draft budget, half-yearly implementation report and draft final accounts;
(2) administering tax policy and the General Tax Administration;
(3) administering customs policy and the General Customs Administration;
(4) managing the Treasury, government cash and public debt;
(5) administering fiscal asset accounts, returns on State-owned capital and public funds; the State-owned Capital Management Commission lawfully performs State enterprise shareholder functions, distinct from industry regulation;
(6) coordinating fiscal and monetary policy with the central bank; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 54
Appointment and removal of the Finance Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Subchapter 5 — Ministry of Justice
Section 55
The Ministry is responsible for judicial administration. Its principal functions are:
(1) fiscal, facilities and information-system support for the judiciary, without interference in judges' or prosecutors' professional personnel matters or cases;
(2) administration of lawyers, notaries, forensic expertise and legal aid;
(3) national prisons and execution of sentences;
(4) judicial examinations and legal professional qualifications;
(5) administrative matters concerning international judicial cooperation and extradition;
(6) administrative support for the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court; and
(7) other statutory functions.
The Ministry must not direct judges' or prosecutors' professional work, assess cases or appraise their performance. Its administration must safeguard judicial independence.
Section 56
Appointment and removal of the Justice Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
The Minister must not concurrently serve as a judge, prosecutor, lawyer or arbitrator.
Subchapter 6 — Ministry of the Interior
Section 57
The Ministry is responsible for domestic administration, public order and civil registration. Its principal functions are:
(1) civilian leadership of the National Police Directorate, without directly commanding investigations;
(2) border administration and immigration;
(3) national identity, household registration, names and civil registers;
(4) emergency rescue, firefighting, civil defence and disaster response;
(5) a single window for legal-person registration of associations and religious groups; electoral participation and political-finance registration are handled by the Independent Electoral Commission, and registration must not license belief or ordinary association;
(6) administration and budget of the National Security Bureau, whose professional operations are independent; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 58
Appointment and removal of the Interior Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
The National Police Director is proposed professionally by the Interior Minister, nominated by the Prime Minister, heard by the House's interior oversight body and appointed by the President for five years, renewable once. Adjustment for statutory dereliction requires due process.
Subchapter 7 — Ministry of Education
Section 59
The Ministry is responsible for national education. Its principal functions are:
(1) drafting national education policy, curricula and standards;
(2) managing national universities, research institutions and public schools;
(3) policy and implementation of multilingual education;
(4) teacher training, certification and professional ethics;
(5) education finance, scholarships, grants and equality;
(6) international educational cooperation; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 60
Appointment and removal of the Education Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Under Article 32 and Section 47, the Minister must have a professional background in education, academia or local governance.
Subchapter 8 — Ministry of Health
Section 61
The Ministry is responsible for public health and medical care. Its principal functions are:
(1) public health policy and infectious disease prevention and control;
(2) health protection, health insurance and basic medical provision;
(3) qualifications and professional regulation of doctors, nurses and pharmacists;
(4) policy for regulating medicines, medical devices and food safety, with implementation assignable to independent regulators;
(5) public hospitals and emergency medical services;
(6) mental health and healthcare for disabled and older people; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 62
Appointment and removal of the Health Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Under Article 32 and Section 47, the Minister must have a professional background in healthcare or local governance.
Subchapter 9 — Ministry of Economy and Industry
Section 63
The Ministry is responsible for the economy, industry, trade and small and medium-sized enterprises. Its principal functions are:
(1) industrial policy, upgrading and strategic industry planning;
(2) domestic and foreign trade and export controls, coordinated with Foreign Affairs and Customs;
(3) policy and support for small and medium-sized enterprises;
(4) energy policy and security, with an Energy Agency established separately if necessary;
(5) industrial policy applicable to enterprises of different ownership forms; State enterprise shareholder functions belong to the State-owned Capital Management Commission and competition enforcement to an independent regulator;
(6) fair competition and anti-monopoly policy, implemented by an independent competition regulator; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 64
Appointment and removal of the Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Under Article 32 and Section 47, the Minister must have a professional background in economics, industry or local governance.
Subchapter 10 — Ministry of Science and Technology
Section 65
The Ministry is responsible for science, technology and innovation. Its principal functions are:
(1) national science and technology policy and development programmes;
(2) basic and applied research and major science and technology projects;
(3) training, recruitment and mobility of scientific and technological personnel;
(4) national laboratories, research institutes and major research infrastructure;
(5) coordination of frontier fields, including smart industries, information technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and quantum technology;
(6) scientific ethics and research integrity; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 66
Appointment and removal of the Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Under Article 32 and Section 47, the Minister must have a professional background in science and technology, industry or local governance.
Subchapter 11 — Ministry of Transport
Section 67
The Ministry is responsible for land, sea, air and rail transport. Its principal functions are:
(1) integrated national transport planning and infrastructure construction policy;
(2) policy and regulation for roads, railways, shipping, aviation and urban rail;
(3) transport safety, operating licences and transport-market regulation;
(4) postal and logistics policy;
(5) national transport hubs and cross-regional projects, coordinated with the House of Regions; and
(6) other statutory functions.
Section 68
Appointment and removal of the Transport Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Subchapter 12 — Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment
Section 69
The Ministry is responsible for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water resources and the ecological environment. Its principal functions are:
(1) agricultural policy, food security and rural development;
(2) forestry, fisheries and livestock policy;
(3) water management and hydraulic works;
(4) ecological protection, nature reserves and biodiversity;
(5) prevention and control of air, water and soil pollution;
(6) climate change, energy conservation and carbon emissions management; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Cross-regional ecological matters and relations with local governments must be coordinated with the House of Regions and handled under the Local Self-Government Act.
Section 70
Appointment and removal of the Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Subchapter 13 — Ministry of Culture and Multilingual Affairs
Section 71
The Ministry is responsible for culture, media, religious affairs and multilingual policy. Its principal functions are:
(1) safeguarding equal use of Chinese, principally traditional characters, Cantonese, German and English under Article 5 of the Constitution;
(2) coordinating multilingual public services and official texts;
(3) cultural heritage, museums, libraries and public archives;
(4) publishing, film, television and artistic policy, without infringing freedom of expression under Article 10;
(5) public media and broadcasting policy, with specific regulation by an independent media regulator;
(6) public services for religious culture and safeguards for religious freedom; legal-person and association registration is lawfully handled by the Interior Ministry's single window without duplicate licensing; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 72
Appointment and removal of the Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Subchapter 14 — Ministry of Social Security and Labour
Section 73
The Ministry is responsible for social security and labour. Its principal functions are:
(1) national pensions, unemployment, occupational injury, maternity and social assistance;
(2) labour policy, working conditions, minimum wages and collective bargaining;
(3) employment services and vocational training;
(4) social protection for disabled people, older people and children;
(5) family and gender equality policy;
(6) social work and public social services; and
(7) other statutory functions.
Section 74
Appointment and removal of the Minister follow Sections 47 and 48 and Article 32 of the Constitution, without individual political consent from both Houses.
Section 75
In addition to ministries, the Government lawfully establishes the National Development Commission to coordinate planning and monitoring, the State-owned Capital Management Commission to perform central State-capital shareholder functions, and statutory executive bureaus and agencies. Both commissions are under Cabinet leadership and do not replace fiscal, sectoral or local statutory powers.
Independent regulators cover finance, energy, food and medicines, media, competition, communications and the National Data Protection Commission. Independence concerns statutory regulatory powers and is not a general exemption from budgets, audit or judicial review.
Regulatory heads serve six years without reappointment, following open professional selection, Prime Ministerial nomination, separate approval by three fifths of all members of each House and presidential appointment. Collegiate bodies have staggered terms under their own laws. Section 99A supplies common appointment safeguards.
Section 76
The Office forms part of the Prime Minister's administration, undertaking policy research, pilot-area assessment and technical planning support. It answers to the Prime Minister and has no independent approval or funding powers.
The Prime Minister appoints its Director professionally. The President may formally request research and receive reports without directing everyday work. Presidential or Cabinet decisions cannot suspend laws in pilot areas. Necessary statutory exceptions must be legislated with scope, duration, rights safeguards and assessment.
Section 77
Executive territorial bodies are governed by their establishing laws.
They must not exercise unauthorised powers or infringe local self-government. Their relations with local government are governed by the Local Self-Government Act.
Their heads are selected, appointed and removed under their establishing laws, normally appointed by the responsible Minister and filed with the Prime Minister and House of the People.
Section 78
Under the Judiciary Act, ordinary courts comprise Basic Courts, Intermediate Courts and the Supreme Court; there is also a Constitutional Court. Judicial legislation determines instances, specialist divisions and cross-regional jurisdiction without reproducing every provincial, municipal and district administrative tier.
Section 79
The Supreme Court has a Chief Justice, two Deputy Chief Justices and statutory Justices, handling major appeals on law, uniform legal application, death-sentence confirmation and other expressly prescribed special procedures.
The National Judicial Council publicly recommends at least two qualified candidates for Chief Justice. The President nominates from the list and appoints with separate approval by three fifths of all members of each House, for nine years without reappointment. Justices are appointed on Council recommendation through the same scrutiny procedure for nine non-renewable years.
The judicial plenary elects Deputy Chief Justices from serving Justices. Removal requires a statutory serious breach, incapacity and due judicial or disciplinary process. Policy disagreement and individual judgments are not grounds for political removal.
Section 80
Heads of Basic and Intermediate Courts are nominated by their judicial plenaries and appointed professionally by the National Judicial Council for six-year administrative terms, renewable once.
Ordinary judges serve until statutory retirement following open professional appointment by the Council. Expiry of a presidency does not itself remove judicial status. Assessment, discipline and remedies follow the Judiciary Act, without individual political selection by the Government.
Section 81
The National Judicial Council handles professional judicial recommendation, appointment and discipline. Its eleven members are the Chief Justice, two Supreme Court judges elected by their peers, four elected Basic and Intermediate Court judges, one representative each of lawyers and legal academia, and one public member recommended by each House who is not a serving political office-holder.
Members serve five years without reappointment and elect their Chair. Personal, close-family or direct interests require recusal. Disciplinary decisions require reasons and remedies before a court uninvolved in the decision. The Council does not direct judgments in individual cases.
Section 82
Under Article 39 of the Constitution, the Court independently exercises constitutional review, constitutional interpretation, State-organ competence dispute and constitutional litigation powers.
Its judgments bind all State and local organs and public and private persons.
Section 83
The Court has nine judges serving nine years without reappointment, three replaced every three years. The President and each House nominate three judges, one from each source in every round. Appointment by the President requires separate approval by two thirds of all members of each House.
The judges elect a President and Vice-President for three-year administrative terms, renewable once without extending judicial terms. Initial staggering is determined by public lots, with three terms each of three, six and nine years.
Combined joint-sitting votes must not replace separate consent. Independence, recusal and vacancy safeguards follow the Judiciary Act and Section 99A.
Section 84
Constitutional Court judges may be removed only:
(1) following successful impeachment proceedings;
(2) where two thirds of the other judges resolve to ask Parliament to commence removal for unconstitutional conduct, serious illegality or gross dereliction; or
(3) for loss of qualification or inability to continue serving.
Safeguards, recusal and declarations of interests follow this Act and the Judiciary Act.
Section 85
Prosecution authorities form part of the judicial system alongside courts and independently exercise public prosecution and investigation-supervision powers, free from interference by executive or legislative bodies, parties, groups or individuals.
Internal independent operation is legally protected. The Prosecutor-General must not give unlawful case instructions or transfer case personnel because of political implications.
Section 86
There is a National Prosecution Directorate and local prosecution authorities according to regional and caseload needs, alongside courts.
The Prosecutor-General is nominated by the President from a list produced through open professional selection and appointed after separate approval by three fifths of all members of each House, for seven years without reappointment. Deputies and local heads follow professional prosecution procedures.
Lawful internal professional instructions must be recorded in writing. Unlawful prosecution must not be ordered, nor case personnel arbitrarily transferred for political reasons.
Section 87
The Prosecutor-General leaves office only for a serious breach determined through lawful proceedings, loss of qualification, incapacity or expiry of term. Parliamentary investigation, supervision and audit may state reasons and refer evidence. A political majority must not remove the Prosecutor-General through ordinary no confidence merely because it disagrees with a case outcome.
Section 88
The Justice Ministry provides statutory judicial administration, financial and facilities support, prisons and legal-service safeguards. Judicial institutions handle internal court administration and judicial recommendation, assessment and discipline; prosecution procedures govern professional prosecution personnel. Resource provision must not become a tool for case direction or professional performance assessment.
Section 89
Judicial police, enforcement, forensic expertise and legal aid bodies are established and operate under the Judiciary Act.
Section 90
The Commission for Public Welfare and Integrity, hereafter the Welfare Oversight Commission, is independently established under Article 43 of the Constitution and exercises its powers without interference from any organ.
Section 91
The Commission receives public-service and maladministration complaints, lawfully investigates integrity and dereliction, publishes welfare assessments and reports to both Houses.
Significant failure of core indicators for two consecutive years triggers investigation of causes, public hearings and a government improvement report, taking external shocks, competence and resources into account. Statistical scores do not automatically establish illegality, impeachment or criminal liability.
Restrictions of liberty, searches, compulsory evidence gathering and freezing require express statutory authority and necessary judicial permission. Criminal leads are referred to prosecutors, and complaint and investigation decisions are subject to judicial remedies.
Section 92
The Commission has nine members. The President and each House propose three candidates meeting professional and conflicts qualifications; appointment by the President requires separate approval by three fifths of all members of each House.
Members serve six years without reappointment, three replaced every two years. Initial terms of two, four and six years, three each, are allocated by public lots. Members elect one Chair and two Deputies. They must not hold party office or paid enterprise positions during service. There is no separate nationwide election.
Section 93
Separate procedures and professional departments deal with complaints, maladministration, integrity investigations and assessment. A separate budget proposal is submitted to Parliament and included in the Government's consolidated budget. Government adjustments require reasons and Parliament decides. The Audit Office audits lawfully but does not replace Parliament in setting the Commission's policy budget.
Section 94
The Office is independently established under Article 44 of the Constitution, audits public finances, State assets and public expenditure independently, and reports to Parliament.
Section 95
Its powers are to:
(1) audit receipts and expenditure of Government, independent bodies, Constitutional Court, Parliament, armed forces and legally authorised organisations;
(2) audit State assets and public debt;
(3) audit public procurement and major infrastructure;
(4) audit taxation, customs and social security funds;
(5) handle breaches lawfully or refer them to competent bodies;
(6) publish an annual audit report to Parliament and the public; and
(7) conduct special audits.
Section 96
The Office has an Auditor-General and two Deputies. Following open professional selection, the President nominates and appoints the Auditor-General with separate approval by three fifths of all members of each House, for seven years without reappointment.
The Auditor-General appoints Deputies professionally. Audit findings and removal enjoy independent safeguards; a change of government does not trigger reselection. Serious breaches and incapacity require due process.
Section 97
Established independently under Article 45 of the Constitution, the Commission administers and supervises elections, voting, referendums and related disputes, ensuring fair procedures and genuine results.
Section 98
Its powers are to:
(1) delimit constituencies, register electors, organise voting, count votes and publish results;
(2) administer presidential, House of the People, House of Regions and local elections and referendums;
(3) scrutinise candidate qualifications, register parties and supervise campaign finance with the Audit Office;
(4) investigate and lawfully address electoral fraud, algorithm manipulation, false information, foreign interference and similar conduct;
(5) institute or participate in electoral proceedings before electoral courts or the Constitutional Court; and
(6) report annually to Parliament.
Section 99
The Commission has nine members. The President and each House propose three candidates with backgrounds in elections, public administration, justice or finance. Appointment by the President requires separate approval by three fifths of all members of each House.
Members serve six non-renewable years, three replaced every two years. Initial terms of two, four and six years, three each, are allocated by public lots. Members elect a Chair for three years without extending membership. Serving party officials, candidates and their campaign managers are ineligible.
Section 99A
Judicial, supervisory, audit, electoral and independent regulatory appointments requiring parliamentary consent must include published qualifications and interests, individual hearings and a vote by each House within thirty days of nomination, with the result explained. Rejection requires a fresh candidate within thirty days and is not deemed approval.
Before the successor takes office, a statutorily designated protected deputy acts; collegiate bodies continue through remaining members. Each acting period is no more than one hundred and eighty days, followed by renewed hearing and reporting, and creates no full substantive term. Courts must not stop adjudicating because of appointment delays; qualified judges uninvolved in the dispute must be arranged lawfully to continue hearings.
Delayed voting, withheld budgets or arbitrary replacement of acting officers must not hollow out independent functions. Courts may order timely correction of breaches of convening, voting or reporting duties, but do not cast Parliament's consent votes for it.
Section 100
The Bank of Einsenland is the central bank, independently responsible for monetary policy, currency stability, legal tender, foreign exchange reserves, payments and settlement, lender-of-last-resort functions and systemic risk assessment.
The Financial Regulatory Authority undertakes statutory prudential and market-conduct regulation. The bank, regulator and Finance Ministry cooperate in crises under published statutory responsibilities. Fiscal guarantees and loss-sharing require separate budgetary authority. Central-bank independence is no unlimited guarantee for government debt or public rescues.
Section 101
The bank has a Governor, two Deputies, a Monetary Policy Committee and a Financial Stability Committee. Following open professional selection, the President nominates and appoints the Governor with separate three-fifths approval in each House, for seven non-renewable years.
Deputies are proposed by the Governor from qualified candidates and, following professional scrutiny and separate three-fifths approval, appointed by the President for six non-renewable years.
The seven-member Monetary Policy Committee comprises the Governor, Deputies and four external professionals. External members undergo open professional selection, nomination by the Prime Minister from qualified candidates, separate three-fifths approval and presidential appointment for six non-renewable years, two replaced every three years. Initial public lots allocate two three-year and two six-year terms. Monetary-policy execution is not subject to everyday executive instructions.
Section 102
Independent regulators lawfully cover finance, energy, food and medicines, media, competition, communications, personal information rights and lawful data processing. Substantive penalties and compulsory evidence gathering require express statutory authority and must not be created by regulators themselves.
The National Data Protection Commission has five members appointed under Sections 75 and 99A for six non-renewable years. Initial public lots allocate one two-year, two four-year and two six-year terms; subsequent replacement follows expiry. Members elect their Chair.
It receives complaints about Government, State enterprise and private processing, examines its legal basis, recommends or lawfully orders correction, and reports to Parliament. Inspections, confidentiality and coercive measures are subject to judicial review, without blanket exclusion for national security. Specific rights and penalties follow relevant legislation.
Administrative authorities handle governmental data use, cyber defence and sectoral operations. The Commission must not also operate as the data business it regulates.
Section 103
The Commission is a professional military coordinating body within the Government's defence system, assisting the Defence Minister with services, establishments, logistics and joint operations. It does not independently decide military policy, war or fiscal budgets. Commander-in-chief powers, political decisions and civilian responsibility follow Articles 51 and 52 of the Constitution.
Section 104
The Defence Minister chairs, the Chief of the General Staff is Deputy Chair, and service and joint-support heads are members. President and Prime Minister may request professional reports and participate constitutionally in major security procedures. Parliamentarians conduct oversight hearings and do not vote on operational decisions within the Commission.
Section 105
The Commission proposes professional military plans, training, establishments and equipment, implements lawful Cabinet defence policy and approved budgets, and coordinates military administration and command. War, mobilisation, cross-border action and major budget matters must be referred constitutionally to the competent bodies, not substituted by internal resolutions.
Section 106
The President is Commander-in-Chief. Major military decisions follow constitutional and statutory procedures, are countersigned by the Prime Minister or Defence Minister, and transmitted through Defence Minister, Chief of the General Staff and statutory operational command bodies. Professional military authentication does not replace civilian countersignature. Article 51 governs Cabinet proposals, parliamentary authorisation, seven-day presidential promulgation, single reconsideration and substitute Prime Ministerial notice for non-emergency decisions.
War creates no command channel bypassing responsible government. An ongoing armed attack permits immediate self-defence under previously legislated civilian command powers, reported within forty-eight hours. Continuing special operations require separate ratification by both Houses within seven days. Without it, action beyond ordinary self-defence and safe withdrawal must stop.
Section 107
The Defence Minister leads defence policy execution, military administrative resources and transmission of lawful orders. The Chief of the General Staff provides professional command with operational, intelligence, logistics, communications-network and service staff bodies. Service, regional and field delegations must be recorded in writing and must not alter civilian leadership or the unified command chain.
Section 108
The Chief is nominated by the Prime Minister from the Defence Minister's professional list, heard by the House's Defence Committee and appointed by the President for four years, renewable once. Statutory dereliction, loss of qualification or incapacity is addressed through the same responsible process and due safeguards.
Service and military-region commanders are recommended by the Chief, examined by the Defence Minister and approved by the Prime Minister; the President lawfully promulgates senior military appointments. The military intelligence head is appointed after the Defence Minister's professional scrutiny and reported to the parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee.
Statutory personnel scrutiny gives the armed forces no political veto over government decisions.
Section 109
The armed forces remain politically neutral. Serving personnel must not hold Cabinet, parliamentary, independent-body, judicial or prosecutorial office, join party campaigns or mobilise publicly for parties. The Defence Minister must meet Section 50's civilian and retirement requirements. Personnel must execute lawful orders and lawfully refuse and report manifestly unlawful orders.
Section 110
Parliamentary oversight includes:
(1) approving defence budgets and strategic reports;
(2) approving war, peace, mobilisation, emergencies and cross-border operations;
(3) hearings, investigations and questioning of the Commission, Ministry and General Staff by the House's Defence and National Security and Intelligence Oversight Committees;
(4) oversight by corresponding House of Regions committees of military matters affecting territories; and
(5) lawful audit of military finances and major equipment by the Audit Office, under confidentiality rules where necessary.
Section 111
The Agency is the Government's external intelligence body, led by the Prime Minister and designated responsible Minister. It handles foreign intelligence analysis, foreign-interference risks and lawful international cooperation.
President and Security Council receive intelligence and submit strategic requirements within their powers; execution follows unified government procedures. Domestic coercive investigation belongs to competent police. Intrusive technical measures require judicial permission and must not evade it in the name of external intelligence.
Section 112
The Prime Minister nominates the Director under public qualification criteria and professional security scrutiny. Following a House Intelligence Oversight Committee hearing, the President appoints for six years. Statutory dereliction or incapacity permits adjustment through due process. Deputies are appointed professionally by the Prime Minister without separate plenary political consent for each.
Section 113
The Bureau falls within the Interior Ministry, handling domestic counter-espionage, counterterrorism intelligence, key-facility and classified-risk assessments under the responsible Minister's statutory leadership.
Police lead terrorism and other criminal cases; the Bureau collects, analyses and transfers leads within its duties. It must not establish a parallel ordinary criminal enforcement system without jurisdictional boundaries. Technical investigation, data access and restrictions of rights require legal authority, necessary judicial permission and independent supervision.
Section 114
The Interior Minister proposes the Director professionally, the Prime Minister nominates, and the President appoints after the House's Intelligence Oversight Committee hearing, for six years. Dereliction-related adjustments require due process. The Interior Minister appoints Deputies professionally and files appointments with the Committee. Organisational safeguards do not remove governmental execution responsibility.
Section 115
The House of the People's Committee specifically supervises intelligence and domestic security bodies. Its powers are to:
(1) consider budgets and annual reports of the Intelligence Agency, Security Bureau and Military Intelligence Bureau;
(2) receive classified briefings;
(3) investigate illegality, abuse or major failures;
(4) give consent opinions on senior intelligence appointments and removals; and
(5) hold closed hearings where necessary.
Members require rigorous security vetting. Classified-information obligations last for life.
The Committee may cooperate with the corresponding House of Regions committee, Constitutional Court and prosecutors in major cases.
Section 116
Central and local powers rest on Article 47 of the Constitution and local self-government legislation, identifying national standards, local rules, executing bodies, finance and supervision separately.
Central territorial bodies must not seize local powers through vertical operational requirements. Agreements on joint tasks must publish lead responsibilities and funding. Local bodies lawfully execute national standards and lawful central tasks; disputes follow constitutional competence proceedings.
Section 117
Tsing Shing City is a province-level directly administered capital district, administratively outside Qinglan Province. Its assembly, Mayor and Government are lawfully formed and responsible for local governance; the centre handles State-organ premises and diplomatic security lawfully. Capital development coordination bodies handle only specified cross-boundary tasks and form no parallel city government. Special organisational rules must protect residents' rights.
Section 118
Central–local competence disputes and coordination of cross-regional administrative matters follow the Local Self-Government Act and Section 10.
Section 119
Establishment of a State organ requires simultaneous approval of staffing, structure and budget.
No organ may exceed its establishment or evade limits through secondment, assignment or contracts.
Section 120
Operations require a lawful budget. Independent bodies, courts, Parliament and armed forces submit separate proposals within the consolidated budget. Government adjustments require reasons; Parliament considers them constitutionally. New bodies must not incur unapproved off-budget expenditure.
If the budget is delayed, Article 23A of the Constitution permits essential functions at prior-year comparable monthly averages and for statutory obligations, with public reports every thirty days. After ninety days, a confidence vote must be completed within fifteen days. Without an absolute majority or a vote, constitutional government formation restarts; basic functions continue during transition.
Temporary appropriations must not fund unapproved major new policies or exempt audit and planning-adjustment procedures.
Section 121
Within the executive, the Prime Minister or authorised Deputy coordinates. Security, military and intelligence professional coordination may use the Council or Commission, but execution remains within unified government procedures. Independent bodies and courts cooperate lawfully without alteration of their independent statutory powers by presidential meetings or Cabinet coordination.
Section 122
Competence disputes are resolved as follows:
(1) disputes within the executive by the Prime Minister;
(2) disputes between executive and independent or judicial bodies, between the legislature and other bodies, or between State and local bodies by the Constitutional Court under competence proceedings; and
(3) pending determination, parties preserve the position and must not unilaterally alter or exercise disputed powers.
Section 123
Statutory powers derive from the Constitution and law. Schedules of powers and responsibilities serve publicity and review. Omitted new statutory authority must be added within thirty days; omission does not remove it. Inclusion without legal authority creates no power. Unlawful expansion and failure of statutory duties may be corrected by courts with lawful accountability.
Section 124
Structures, procedures, powers and responsibilities schedules, budgets, final accounts, decision bases and execution results must be published promptly except national security, trade secrets and personal privacy matters.
Disclosure must be available in all four official languages: Chinese, principally traditional characters, Cantonese, German and English.
Section 125
Government data sharing requires defined statutory duties, specific purposes, necessary scope and retention periods, with least-privilege access, logs and security audit. Unlimited mutual access is not the default.
Bodies must lawfully reuse existing statutory materials to reduce repeated submission. Without lawful sharing grounds, alternative service routes must be available; convenience must not coerce consent to additional purposes.
Natural persons may lawfully access, rectify and request erasure or restriction, complain to the Data Protection Commission and seek judicial remedies. Statutory retention and security exceptions must be specific, necessary and reviewable.
Section 126
Electronic signatures, documents, service, video hearings and remote cooperation have the same effect as traditional methods. Detailed rules are prescribed by law or administrative regulation.
Section 127
Each organ must annually assess performance of its statutory duties and publish a report.
The Welfare Oversight Commission, Audit Office, Parliament and public may comment on, question and investigate it.
Section 128
States of emergency, orders, duration and ratification follow Articles 53 to 55 and Section 31 uniformly. Special measures in other laws must not lower the safeguards of seven-day ratification, thirty-day duration and judicial supervision.
Section 129
Parliament, courts and independent oversight continue in emergencies. Electoral postponement must comply with constitutional and electoral limits and periods. Special measures lapse immediately without ratification, on expiry or termination. Necessary winding-up does not extend rights restrictions; continued restrictions require an independent ordinary-law basis.
Section 130
Special commissions, leadership groups and task forces established for temporary tasks:
(1) require a clear basis in law or administrative regulation;
(2) require a defined sunset period of no more than three years, extendable once in special circumstances with parliamentary approval;
(3) cease automatically on completion or expiry;
(4) must not become permanent or usurp permanent bodies' statutory powers; and
(5) must report progress to Parliament every six months.
Section 131
References to all members and special majorities use each House's full statutory membership separately. Vacancies, abstentions and recusals do not lower thresholds. A majority means more than half; three fifths and two thirds are rounded upwards. Joint discussion does not replace separate votes.
Acting after expiry does not create a new full term. Impeachment is strictly distinguished from ordinary no confidence, discipline and prosecution. Heads of both Houses are designated Speakers; the everyday term parliamentary chair does not alter powers.
Section 132
Countersignature is the separate signature of the responsible Prime Minister or civilian Minister on a lawfully formed decision, carrying political, administrative and legal responsibility within their duties. Military professional authentication does not replace civilian responsibility. Countersignature alone does not imply faultless joint criminal liability for another's offence.
Section 133
Each organ determines its name, emblem, seals, document formats and official-language versions under statutory rules and files them with Parliament.
Section 134
Heads and senior officials must declare assets and conflicts on entering and leaving office and undergo checks by the Welfare Oversight Commission and Audit Office. Details follow the Public Officials' Integrity and Asset Declarations Act.
Section 135
The Constitutional Court handles constitutional interpretation and State-organ competence disputes; competent courts interpret ordinary law under the Judiciary Act. Other bodies must not create powers by internal interpretation. The Legislative Scrutiny Bureau annually provides technical and implementation assessments without replacing adjudication.
Section 136
Within one hundred and eighty days after amendment, bodies must transfer powers, budgets, personnel and records and publish a transition schedule. Lawful contracts, cases and national planning obligations pass to statutory successors without fresh project approval or proceedings merely because names change.
Protected independent office-holders must not be removed early merely for organisational reordering. Staggering is introduced on lawful vacancies and first establishment. The new House of Regions system transitions under the Electoral Act; existing bodies lawfully maintain necessary functions before local representatives are formed.
Reorganisation does not suspend services, adjudication, lawful investigations or essential works. The former name “National Court” uniformly denotes the Supreme Court in current legislation; case jurisdiction remains allocated under the Judiciary Act.
Section 137
This Act takes effect on the date of promulgation.